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Abstract
This paper attempts to investigate the relation among wages, unem-
ployment and obesity and to identify public policies to address the prob-
lem of over-weightness. To this purpose, a simple search and matching
model of labour market is developed. Our framework tries to capture the
relationship between obesity and employment/unemployment by assum-
ing that the fraction of obese workers is a function of the ratio of vacant
jobs to unemployment (labour market tightness). We argue that if obesity
is positively related with employment, then social optimality dictates the
imposition of a lump-sum tax on all individuals. In the opposite case a
subsidy should be given.
Keywords: Obesity, Taxation, Unemployment, Wages
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
Obesity is a growing health problem in the developed world, as it is related
to a number of serious diseases, e.g. coronary heart disease, type II diabetes,
osteoarthritis, hypertension and stroke (NHLBI, 1998). In practice, researchers
use mainly the Body Mass Index (BMI), i.e. weight in kilos over height in meters
squared, in order to quantify obesity. Thus, a Body Mass Index above 30 is a
signal for excessive storage of fat in the body (CDCP, 2009). However, recent
research criticizes the BMI on the grounds that it does not distinguish between
fat and fat-free mass such as muscle and bone (Burkhauser & Cawley, 2008).
More specically, Burkhauser & Cawley (2008) argued that indexes such as
Total Body Fat, Percentage Body Fat, Fat-free Mass and Waist Circumference
are more accurate measures of fatness.
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Apart from the associated health problems, obesity has signicant economic
aspects. As to the reasons held responsible for over the normal weight, econo-
mists emphasize the role of decreasing food prices due to technological change
(Komlos et al., 2004). More specically, the fall in commodity prices and the
decrease in the preparation time of a meal, caused a surge in caloric intake
which resulted in an increase in the Body Mass Index (BMI). Another economic
aspect of obesity is the relationship between obesity and labour market out-
comes, which has been the focus of current research. Empirical work for U.S.
(Cawley, 2004; Baum & Ford, 2004; Han et al., 2009) and Europe (Morris, 2006;
Brunello & DHombres, 2007; Garcia & Quintana-Domeque, 2007; Greve, 2008)
has shown that obesity as measured by various indicators has in most cases a
negative impact on wages. Baum & Ford (2004) found among others that obese
workers su¤er a wage penalty in the range of 0.7-6.3 percent. In addition, a
large part of the research on this eld reports that obese females su¤er more
of a wage penalty than obese males and that there are di¤erences by ethnic-
ity and/or race. As for employment is concerned, Morris (2007) showed that
obesity has a statistically signicant and negative e¤ect on employment in both
males and females.
The possible explanations for why obese workers might receive lower wages
can be categorized as follows: (i) Obese workers may have lower work ability
and thereby lower productivity (Baum & Ford, 2004; Burkhauser & Cawley,
2008; Greve, 2008). This fact could reduce the bargaining power of employees,
related to hiring, wage-setting and promotion (Puhl & Brownell, 2001) (ii) Obese
workers may su¤er a wage penalty because they value future utility less. More
specically, economically myopic workers, who have higher marginal rates of
time preference, may be less concerned about the possible long-term health
e¤ects of obesity. Thus, these workers will consume more high-calorie foods
and exercise less at the expense of lower levels of health (Komlos et al., 2004).
Hence, these workers face a higher probability of health problems and as a result
a higher cost for health care (Baum & Ford, 2004; McCormick et al., 2007) (iii)
Obese workers face a handicap in face to face communication with customers
(Baum & Ford, 2004).
There is no doubt that obesity has changed from a matter of personal choice
to one of government policy, as it is related to increasing government spending.
The economic costs of obesity are substantial: medical costs for overweight and
obesity are estimated to be $147 billion or 9.1% of U.S. health care expenditures
(Brownell, et al., 2009, p.1602). In addition, recent research concludes that
Americans are more likely to be obese than to smoke cigarettes or use illegal
drugs (Philipson, 2001, p.1). The problem stems from the fact that society bears
an extra cost in the form of increased medical care expenses, unemployment
benets (as obesity is negatively related with employment), incapacity benets,
foregone tax revenues (due to lost production) etc., that are provoked by the
higher than optimal consumption of the population of obese.
Thus, the government faces a negative market externality which requires
correction in the form of taxes or subsidies. A possible solution for the con-
frontation of obesity could be the imposition of taxes on junk food(Brownell
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et al., 2009) since the consumption of such products has a major contribution to
the problem. However, this policy imposes costs on people who consume these
types of products in moderation, too. Another policy could be to tax individ-
uals according to their weight or according to their BMI (Mann, 2008). But,
this policy violates the privacy of individuals and is di¢ cult to implement. An
alternative policy might be a subsidy which could be given only to non-obese
individuals (Mann, 2008). The size of the tax could be determined by the Con-
tingent Valuation analysis (Cawley, 2008). In our model, we seek to propose a
policy which takes into account for both the wage di¤erentials between obese
and non-obese and the impact of employment on obesity. We argue that social
optimality can be restored by the imposition of a lump-sum tax or subsidy on
all individuals (i.e. obese and non-obese). The choice between a tax or sub-
sidy depends on the sign of the relationship between unemployment and obesity
level; if it is negative then a tax should be levied. If it is positive a subsidy
should be given.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section the basic model is
presented. In Section 3, the steady state equilibrium is dened. The socially op-
timal form of government intervention is deployed in Section 4. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
We consider a continuous-time model with risk neutral and innitely lived
agents. A continuum of workers, normalized to unity, participate in the market.
Individuals are of two types: obese (hereafter denoted by b) and non obese
(hereafter denoted by nb).
Some studies argue that there is a positive relationship between unemploy-
ment and obesity (e.g. Smith et al., 2007), whereas some others argue that this
relation is negative (e.g. Ruhm, 2000, 2003). Hence, in order to capture the
ndings of the literature, we assume that the fraction of obese individuals in the
total population is a function of the unemployment rate u and equal to p(u).
Furthermore, no assumption is made about the sign of the rst derivative of
p(u) (i.e. it can be either positive or negative). If p0(u) > 0, then we assume
that lim
u!0
p(u) = 0 and lim
u!1
p(u) = 1, whereas if p0(u) < 0, then lim
u!0
p(u) = 1 and
lim
u!1
p(u) = 0.
Workers are either employed or unemployed and jobs are either lled or
vacant. The death rate of jobs is exogenous and equal to . We assume
a free entry regime for vacancies, i.e. vacancies are created, whenever it is
protable to do so. Each rm o¤ers only one job and each individual cannot
be employed in di¤erent jobs. Moreover, we assume that there is no on-the-
job search. Unemployed workers obtain zero utility ow. Firms and workers,
discount the future at the same rate r. The cost of holding a vacancy is constant
and equal to c. This cost sunks when the job is lled. The production technology
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is the following:
yi = kia (1)
where a; ki are positive constants with ki = 1 for i = nb and ki = k < 1 for
i = b.
Workers and vacancies meet each other randomly, according to a Pissarides
constant returns to scale matching function, m(u; v), where u, is the unemploy-
ment rate and v, is the measure of vacancies. Hence, the arrival rate for workers
is m(), where  = v=u, is the measure of labour market tightness. The usual
properties hold for m(), i.e. m0() > 0 and lim
!0
m() = 0 . The arrival rate
for jobs is m()= with [m()=]0 < 0, and lim
!0
[m()=] = 1. Moreover, when
a match between a worker and a vacancy is formed the wage is given by the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution.
For a worker of type i (i = b; nb) with productivity yi, Ui(yi) is the value
of unemployment, Wi(yi) is the value of employment, Ji(yi) is the value to the
employer of lling a job and nally V is the value of a vacancy.
2.2 Workers
2.2.1 Unemployed
The value function of an unemployed worker of type i acceptable to em-
ployers is equal to
rUi(yi) = m()[Wi(yi)  Ui(yi)] (2)
According to equation (1), the ow value of unemployment for a worker of
type i acceptable to employers is equal to the arrival rate of job o¤ers times the
capital gain by becoming employed.
2.2.2 Employed
The ow value of employment for a worker of type i is
rWi(yi) = wi(yi) + [Ui(yi) Wi(yi)] (3)
where wi(yi) is the wage received by a worker of type i.
Equation (3) determines the ow value of employment as the sum of the
ow return to employment (the wage) plus the instantaneous capital loss. It is
obvious that workers of type i not acceptable to rms have Wi(yi) = 0.
2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Vacant
The discounted prot from holding a vacancy can be written as
4
rV =  c+ m()

[p(u)maxfJb(yb)  V; 0g+ (1  p(u))maxfJnb(ynb)  V; 0g]
(4)
The term inside the brackets in (4) denotes the expected capital gain from
lling a vacancy. It is clear that given wi(yi), a rm will hire a worker if
Ji(yi)  V .
2.3.2 Filled
Using (1), the ow value to a job lled by a worker of type i is
rJi(yi) = kia  wi(yi) + [V   Ji(yi)] (5)
From equations (1), (2), (3) and (5) we get
Ui(yi) =
m()wi(yi)
r[r +m() + ]
(6)
Wi(yi) =
[r +m()]wi(yi)
r[r +m() + ]
(7)
Ji(yi) =
kia  wi(yi) + V
r + 
(8)
2.4 Wage Formation and Reservation Skill
Lemma 1 All meetings between workers and vacancies will end up to pro-
duction.
Proof. The surplus produced by the match between a worker of type i and a
rm is
Si(yi) = Ji(yi) +Wi(yi)  V   Ui(yi) (9)
Substituting (7), (8) and free entry condition V = 0, in equation (9), we get
(r + )Si(yi) = yi   rUi(yi) (10)
Lets assume that there is a yRi , such that Si(y
R
i ) = 0. This implies that if a
worker of type i has a yi  yRi , then he is never employed by a rm. Substituting
yRi in (10) yields
yRi = rUi(y
R
i ) (11)
E¢ ciency implies V = Ji(yRi ). Hence, by (8), (11) and the free entry con-
dition V = 0, we get
wi(y
R
i )
r
= Ui(y
R
i ) (12)
Substituting (12) into (11) gives
yRi = wi(a
R
i )
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From the above analysis follows that
Wi(y
R
i ) = Ui(y
R
i ) = wi(y
R
i ) = 0 (13)
Hence, yRi = 0, for i = b; nb. But yi is positive by denition.
Q.E.D.
Symmetric Nash bargaining and free entry condition implies that
1
2
Si(yi) =Wi(yi)  Ui(yi) = Ji(yi) (14)
Using (6), (7) and (8), we get that the wage earned by an individual of type
i is
wi(yi) =
yi[r +  +m()]
2(r + ) +m()
(15)
3 Steady State Equilibrium
In steady state the evolution of employed individuals is equal to zero, i.e.
the ow of workers out of unemployment should be equal to the ow of work-
ers back to unemployment. We showed previously that all individuals are get
employed as soon as they meet a vacancy. Steady state implies
m()u = (1  u))
u =

m() + 
(16)
As we note from (14), steady state unemployment is a decreasing function
of labour market tightness.
Denition 2 A steady state equilibrium is a four tuple yRb ; y
R
nb; u; , that satisfy:
(i) Free entry, i.e. V = 0, (ii) Balanced ows,i.e. , the ow of workers out of
unemployment equals to the ow of workers into unemployment [eq. (14)] and
(iii) The reservation property in Lemma 1.
Using equations (1), (4), (8), (15), (16), the free entry condition and Lemma
1, we get that the market equilibrium value of  and hence of steady state
unemployment is given by solving the following equation
c =
m()a


p()k + 1  p()
2(r + ) +m()

(17)
where p is expressed as a function of , since steady state unemployment is
a function of labour market tightness.
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Proposition 3 Equation (17) has a unique solution in , if k > 1=2 and m= >
p [where m= (p) is the absolute value of the elasticity of m()= (p()) with
respect to labour market tightness].
Proof. Case 1: p0() > 0
Di¤erentiating the right hand side (hereafter r.h.s.) of (17) with respect to
, and call it  () we get
 () =
a
n
Z[m
0
()  m()] + m()[p0()(k   1)Z  m0()]
o
2Z2
(18)
where Z = m() + 2(r + ) and  = 1  (1  k)p().
Expression (18) is less than zero since k; p() < 1 and [m()=]0 < 0, by
denition. Since p0() > 0, from (16) and by denition we get that lim
!0
p() = 0
and lim
!1
p() = 1.
Case 2: p0() < 0
If k > 1=2, then 1  (1  k)p() > (1  k)p(). Moreover, if m= > p, then
 m()p0() <  m0()p() + m()p(). Under these assumptions, it can be
easily proven that  () < 0. Given that p0() < 0, from (16) and by denition
we get that lim
!0
p() = 1 and lim
!1
p() = 0.
Finally, it can be easily postulated that lim
!0
m()a

h
p()k+1 p()
2(r+)+m()
i
= 1 and
lim
!1
m()a

h
p()k+1 p()
2(r+)+m()
i
= 0 in both Cases.
Q.E.D.
When p0() < 0, an increase in  has two opposite e¤ects on the expected
revenues from creating a vacancy [r.h.s. of (17)]; A negative one [which decreases
the r.h.s. of (17)] due to the congestion externality created in vacant jobs, and
a positive one [which increases the r.h.s. of (17)] as a result of the decrease of
p() [this occurs because k < 1, i.e. obese individuals are less productive].
4 Social E¢ ciency
The social planner has the following objective function:
H =
Z 1
0
e rt [p()ka(1  u) + (1  p())a(1  u)  cu] dt (19)
The expression inside the brackets is the current value of the net social
surplus, which is equal to the total expected output (the sum of the rst two
terms) minus the total social cost of vacancies (each vacancy costs society c and
given the denition of , the measure of vacancies is equal to v = u).
Moreover, the social planner faces the following restriction, which determines
the evolution of unemployment:
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_u = (1  u) m()u (20)
Let  be a co-state variable. The optimal path of labour market tightness
() and unemployment satises (20) and the following Euler conditions
e rt[p0()a(1  k)(1  u) + cu] + m0()u = 0 (21)
_  e rtf[1  (1  k)p()]a+ cg   [ +m()] = 0 (22)
To derive the conditions for the social e¢ cient level of , we substitute 
from (21) into (22) and we evaluate the outcome in the steady state ( _u = 0) to
obtain
[ + r +m()][c + a(1  k)p0()m()] = fc + a[1  p()(1  k)]gm0() (23)
Solving the above equation with respect to  we get the social e¢ cient value
of labour market tightness.
Hosios (1990), demonstrated that a decentralized economy may lead to an
e¢ cient outcome in a wide variety of search models of labour market, if the
bargaining power of the worker is equal to the elasticity of the expected dura-
tion of a vacancy with respect to labour market tightness (or alternatively the
bargaining power of the rm is equal to the absolute value of the elasticity of
the expected duration of unemployment with respect to labour market tight-
ness). Since, the expected duration of unemployment in our setting is 1=m(),
and bargaining power of rms is 0:5 by denition, Hosios condition implies that
m0()
m() = 0:5.
Multiplying both sides of (23) by m() , and applying Hosios condition we
get
[ + r +m()][c + a(1  k)p0()m()]
m()
= 0:5fc + a[1  p()(1  k)]g (24)
Solving (24) with respect to c we get
c =
m()af[1  p()(1  k)]  2p0()(1  k)[ + r +m()]g
[2(r + ) +m()]
(25)
As we easily note, (25) is di¤erent from (17) and thus the decentralized
outcome does not coincide with the social outcome even if the Hosios condition
is satised.
However, it can be easily shown that the social outcome is equal to the
market outcome, if we impose a lump-sum tax (or subsidy) equal to  and q ,
where q 2 [0; 1], on obese and non obese individuals respectively, with
 =
2p
0
()a(1  k)[ + r +m()]
[q + p()(1  q)] (26)
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where  < yi[r++m()]2(r+)+m() .
If p0() > 0, then  is a tax, whereas if p0() < 0, then  is a subsidy1 . If
authorities cannot implement an e¢ cient mechanism for trackingobese, then
q = 1, otherwise q < 1. The latter case, when a tax is levied, can be considered
as equivalent with imposing a lump sum tax to all individuals and giving a tax
refund only to non obese. The lower the value of q, the higher the level of the
refund. On the other hand, when a subsidy is given, the fact that obese receive
a higher subsidy can be justied on the grounds that an extra amount of money
is needed so as to lose weight (e.g. gym subscriptions).
In a standard search model of labour market, when a worker decides wether
to accept or reject an employment o¤er, it does not take into account the impact
that this decision has on the employment probabilities that others face. The
same holds for the decision process of rms. More specically, both rms and
workers congesting each other. One more hiring rm makes searching workers
better o¤, but it makes other hiring rms worse o¤. On the other hand, one more
searching worker makes hiring rms better o¤but other searching workers worse
o¤. In a traditional model with ex ante homogeneous agents and a free entry
regime for rms, equating the bargaining power of workers with the elasticity
of the expected duration of a vacancy with respect to labour market tightness
internalizes this congestion externality and leads to an e¢ cient market equi-
librium. The reason why this internalization occurs when the aforementioned
condition holds is the following: the elasticity of the expected duration of a
vacancy with respect to labour market tightness (the elasticity of the expected
duration of unemployment with respect to labour market tightness), measures
the congestion created by one rm (worker) to others; the higher its value, the
higher the externality. Hence, if the elasticity of the expected duration of a
vacancy (the elasticity of the expected duration of unemployment with respect
to labour market tightness) is high, it is an indication that at the margin rms
(workers) are causing more congestion to other rms (workers) than the conges-
tion caused by workers (rms) to other workers (rms). In that case the social
planner eliminates this externality by taxingrms (workers) through the in-
crease of the workers (rms) share in the wage bargain [the increase (decrease)
of the bargaining power of worker, will decrease (increase) the equilibrium num-
ber of rms entering the market and therefore the congestion externality created
by a rm (worker) to other rms (workers) will be decreased].
However, if we have a model with ex ante heterogeneous individuals and
no rm entry (e.g. Lockwood, 1986), another kind of externality arises. This
type of externality is working through the match acceptance probabilities. More
specically, in such models a number of individuals remains always unemployed
(discouraged worker e¤ect) in equilibrium, since no rm accepts them. This ba-
sically occurs because workers and rms have di¤erent reservation rules in that
case. However, if we add the assumption of free entry for rms in models with
1Equation (26) can be derived if we equate (25) and the properly transformed version of
(17) so as to incorporate the relative tax (subsidy) (see appendix) and solve with respect to
 .
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ex ante heterogeneous workers, this externality will be eliminated, reservation
rules will be equalized and the equilibrium outcome will be e¢ cient under Ho-
sios condition. Nonetheless, in our model there is one more source of externality
which arises from the fact that obese individuals have lower productivity and
their number depends on the level of labour market tightness. More specically,
the entry of one more hiring rm creates lower (greater) congestion to other
rms regarding their encounterwith obese workers than with non obese. Mar-
ket fails to internalize this externality, which leads to ine¢ ciently high (low)
entry of rms [and consequently to ine¢ ciently high (low) labour market tight-
ness2 ] even if Hosios holds. As mentioned above, this problem can be solved
by imposing a lump-sum tax (subsidy) as described above. Since a part of the
tax burden (subsidy benet) is transferred by workers to rms through the bar-
gaining process, the number of rms is appropriately controlled (disincentive
for rms entry in case of tax and incentive in case of subsidy) and e¢ ciency is
restored.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we utilized search and matching theory to analyze the e¤ect
of obesity on labour market equilibrium. We characterize the unique steady
state of the market, and show that it leads to an ine¢ cient outcome; there is an
excess of obese individuals leading to a sub-optimal level of the ratio of vacancies
to unemployment. Social e¢ ciency can be achieved through government inter-
vention. More specically, if the level of unemployment is negatively correlated
with obesity level, then a lump-sum tax should be levied on all individuals. In
the opposite case a subsidy should be given. However, the easier to trackand
register obese employees, the higher the tax (subsidy) di¤erentials in favour of
non-obese (obese).
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6 Appendix
If we impose a lump-sum tax equal to  and q on obese and non obese indi-
viduals respectively, then (3) will become
rWi(yi) = wi(yi)  q + [Ui(yi) Wi(yi)] (A.1)
where q = 1, if i = b.
Given A.1, (17) will become
c =
m()


a[1  (1  k)p()]   [q + p()(1  q)]
2(r + ) +m()

(A.2)
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